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Somalia: A Regional Security Dilemma

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It is fitting to regard the chaos in Somalia as the internationalization of internal war. Weapons, aid resources, and media coverage have converged from abroad in Somalia; they have all exacerbated the conflict there, principally by prolonging it. The origins of the war are international as well, traceable to colonially manipulated tribalisms and an insufficiently prepared postcolonial series of governments. These problems only intensified during the Cold War as the superpowers sought to keep Somalia out of each other's clutches and as the Somali leadership sought to extract as much as possible from them by exploiting international rivalries. Hence, it is essentially academic to try to figure out whether the dissolution of Somalia was precipitated by the Cold War—and the heightened corruption fostered by foreign aid—or the end of the Cold War, as the aid flow stopped.

The aid flow is certainly central to the drama, as is the timing of Somalia's final disintegration. However, conflict may also be structurally endemic; this being the case, the questions to answer are whether the particulars in Somalia are generalizable and whether what has happened to Somalia can happen elsewhere. These questions make the premise of the internationalization of an internal conflict more difficult. First, I must demonstrate that internationalization may not be the culprit it has been assumed to be. Second, I must also look to Somali social organization for proximate if not determinate causes of conflict.

Indeed, there are two kinds of arguments that can be made about Somalia's dissolution, and both can be linked. First, Somalia as a nation never really did exist.[1] In other words, Somalia is a container of people whose lines were drawn from the outside; in this sense, it is no different from any other African country, despite irredentist rhetoric to the contrary. Second, conflict was bound to erupt in the space that has come to be called Somalia precisely because the state was incapable of either breaking down

Somali social organization or creating a nation out of it once irredentism failed.

Somalia's Internationalization

Despite our tendency to focus on the more recent past to explain the present, Somalia has long been internationalized. Even Richard Burton, the first European to leave a written record about his penetration through Somalia to Harar (in 1854), commented on how likely one was to meet some otherwise indistinguishable-looking nomad in the interior who had actually traveled the world as a sailor.[2] Indeed, his own introduction to Somalis came in Aden—which is where he hired his Somali servants for the journey.[3]

Written accounts in Arabic push Somalia's internationalization much further back than even Burton (who was probably Somalia's best Western ethnographer) realized.[4] It is likely that Somalia was the Land of Punt, that at least some of the incense in the incense trade originated in Somalia, and that Mogadishu served as a service port for ships making their way up the eastern coast of Africa in the tenth century, if not well before.[5]

Even on a more localized scale, Somalia has long been internationalized because of its nomadic population. Two truisms about pastoral nomads also apply to Somalis: The first is that pastoral nomads *are* peripatetic; the second is that they engage in trade—of livestock products for grains—and often this trade is long distance.[6] This means that Somalis have long been engaged in moving across boundaries of linguistics, culture, and modes of production. Also, given nomadism, it is virtually impossible to practice pastoralism *and* recognize any geographical bounds as permanently inviolate (as long as livestock can be maintained in the area).

On a number of levels, then, Somalis have acted, and even thought, internationally for quite some time. However, how Somalis have projected themselves to non-Somalis has changed, which in turn has altered their relationships with their neighbors. This change is due to their containment in, and representation by, the concept of Somalia as a nation-state.

There are at least four specific, significant ways in which Somalia's identity has been given form: First, the establishment of nation-state boundaries between Somalia and Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti, and Somalia and Kenya has meant that so-called ethnic Somalis who traverse or live beyond these borders with their herds present a "national" problem for Somalia and an "ethnic" problem for Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. The problems engendered by the nomadic Somalis have provoked conflict among these states,[7] which in turn has further cemented where the world recognizes Somalia's boundaries to lie and its sovereignty to begin and end.

Second, the establishment of an internationally recognized entity called Somalia has meant that it is included in international world bodies and is automatically treated as a nation by non-Somali entities—other countries, nongovernmental organizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank.

Third and concomitant with Somalia's international status has been the elevation of a representative Somali head of state. Most recently this was Mohammed Siad Barre, who busily projected himself across the international stage by inserting himself (and Somalia) into regional and superpower politics, taking advantage of others' latent disputes to garner unprecedented quantities of resources for the Somali state (whose coffers Siad Barre controlled). Again, the more the Somali government was able to present Somalia as a nation like all others, the more trappings of belonging to a nation Somalis were granted, and the more Somalia seemed to cohere. Of course, too, the more resources and prestige the Somali government was able to accrue, the more impact the state had within Somalia—and as long as the state worked, the illusion of nation did not appear so thin.

Fourth, there was yet another international source of support that helped the economy, and thus the state, appear domestically viable. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, an unprecedented number of Somali laborers migrated to the Gulf states and remitted considerable sums of money home.[8] How these remittances were handled (often under the table) should have undermined state financial structures, but the inability of these structures to work equitably meant that this added flow actually allowed the state to survive, because its people could.

Despite the degrees to which such levels of internationalization gave currency to Somalia, the structural potential for conflict was never entirely dismantled. Indeed, regardless of the overwhelming number of descriptions that cite Somalia (along with Lesotho and Swaziland) as ethnically homogeneous—or as Laitin and Samatar put it, as a *nation* in search of a state—there is nothing ethnically, linguistically, or culturally homogeneous about all of the people occupying Somalia.[9] Such descriptions are nationalist rhetoric designed to make history (by making a Somalia), which in part has been done by reading protonationalism back into the movement led by Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hasan against first the Ethiopians and then the British and Italians just after the turn of this century. While the Sayyid was clearly a spiritual leader of tremendous vision and a poet of even wider appeal, he did not unite all Somalis; in fact, he split Somali loyalties, some of which remain split today. Nor did he act any less opportunistically in securing himself supporters than his British or Italian foes. Like them, he practiced "divide and conquer" techniques and (not unlike his eventual successor, Siad Barre) skillfully played off both sides (other clans) against his own (allegedly nonclannist) middle.[10]

For scholars to perpetuate this myth about homogeneity (with or without the Sayyid as anchor) is to ignore the realities of the different-looking, different-speaking, different-living peoples who inhabit Somalia. The most glaring differences lie between pastoralists or their descendants and interriverine farmers, who not only have supposedly different physiognomies but speak different languages and practice wholly different sets of customs, doing so with the explicit understanding that their relationship is hierarchical and grounded in myths of origin.[11]

To understand these cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences, one need only consider Somalia's geography—or its wind patterns and soil types. For instance, northern Somalia directly faces the Gulf, as do its winds at certain times of the year. Central and southern Somalia are positioned quite differently, and neither northern nor central Somalia can support extensive or irrigated agriculture. Only the interriverine region in the southern portion of the country can keep farmers tied directly to the soil. On a smaller scale, soil type and rain patterns determine whether people raise camels or cattle, more sheep than goats, millet or *qat;* whether they move in wide swathes seasonally or stay put; whether they have the mobility and strength to exploit others or must face periodic exploitation themselves; and how and with whom they are socially organized.

Therefore, the rhetoric of a long-standing Somali nationality has only ever been a pleasant, sometimes even soothing, but still costly siren song. Long before any internationalization—before British and Italian, or Ottoman, Ethiopian, and Egyptian intrusions—distinctions existed among Somalis and were such that shared sentiments were pegged not to fixed boundaries but to fixed commonalities.

These sentiments are encoded in clan-family differences, built up through lineages, subclans, and clans. Genealogical history is not just a record of descent and of who is related to whom how many generations ago. Instead, it is a memory of group strengths, group allegiances, and group enmities that, to be remembered historically, means groups must have had a territorial position from which to expand or contract.[12] Indeed, this grounding of genealogical relationship in territory explains why the Hawiye now control Mogadishu, the Isaq the Republic of Somaliland, and the Majertein the northeast—and why none is eager to share control with others. Yet if this linkage is so strong, why hasn't all of the landscape been genealogically redistributed? Why is there still so much fighting? The obvious answer consists of two parts: First, there is fighting where boundaries are contested or are impossible to draw, in other words, where rural-urban or rural-rural migration has mixed people up. And, second, there is the issue of control and what it is over.

In the genealogical relationship to territory looms the specter of segmentary lineage opposition. Encapsulated in "I against my brother, my brother and I against our cousin, our cousins and us against the world," it is the most elegant model political anthropologists have for explaining pastoralist conflict.[13] For generations it has been applied to nomadic peoples both situationally and as situational theory: Nested groups fission and fuse depending on circumstances.[14] For example, segmentary lineage opposition explains why the Hawiye fight the Darood: There are too few genealogical links among the Hawiye, but fighting the Darood keeps them united. Now the Hawiye fight amongst themselves in Mogadishu because not only are there spoils to fight over, but the Darood no longer pose a significant threat there.

Segmentary lineage opposition has long engendered debate in anthropology. Is it a model *of* or a model *for*? And are people really so balanced in their oppositions? For numerous reasons, many anthropologists question the explanatory value of such an equilibrium-driven model.[15] However, these debates about the dynamic or static nature of society may be missing the broader point: The Hawiye exist only in opposition, and then only as a collectivity into which people feel pushed. Otherwise, despite individuals' ties to an area, "Hawiye" has no solidity as a concept, let alone a corporate body: no hierarchy, no offices, no organizational charter. Consequently, its meaning cannot be precisely understood: Is it opposition that generates the Hawiye, or do the Hawiye generate the opposition? Is it defensive action or offensive reaction that calls the Hawiye into being?[16]

Historically this is what we must now examine: at the point where internationalization, timing, geography, and culture converge.

The Aftermath of the Ogaden War

For the sake of brevity, we will concentrate on the last internationalization of an internal conflict in the Horn: the Ogaden War (1977–1978). Although this war has already been well-studied,[17] it is significant to this discussion, because just after Somalia's defeat, the country's dissolution took its greatest leap forward.[18]

Throughout the 1970s into the late 1980s, the Horn of Africa drew significant superpower involvement. In addition to the fact that imperial Ethiopia and Somalia shared a long history of enmity, Ethiopia was invariably considered the greater prize by the superpowers. Thus, as long as Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie was in the U.S. camp (a relationship the United States inherited from the British), Siad Barre had little choice but to try to woo the Soviets to support Somalia. This support lasted until Somalia invaded Ethiopia and was on the verge of wresting away the Ogaden in 1977. At least three different rationales fueled this invasion: First, with the fall of Haile Selassie in 1974 and the resultant

turmoil in Ethiopia, the Ogaden looked winnable. Second, successfully wresting away the Ogaden would fulfill Somalis' irredentist dreams. Third, the Soviets had helped build Somalia's armed forces into what many considered to be the most powerful in sub-Saharan Africa.[19]

Somalia was on the verge of victory when Ethiopia's new Marxist government decided to accept the embrace of the USSR and its allies, luring the Soviets away from Somalia, and thus costing Siad Barre the war. Ironically, this loss inadvertently won Somalia what became unprecedented amounts of assistance, as the new Soviet bloc presence in Ethiopia virtually guaranteed a Western (and Arab) response in support of Somalia.[20]

The aid avalanche resulting from Somalia's defeat and the Soviet Union–United States flip-flop over the spoils of the war was one trigger for Somalia's subsequent dissolution. Indeed, it was due to this switch that Somalia traded up—foreign assistance in the form of industry, state farms, and other supervised inputs from the Soviet bloc for money and goods from Western and petro-rich Muslim states. After the Soviets were dismissed from Somalia in 1977, the Arab states essentially stepped in before Western nations began refilling the assistance gap;[21] within the year, aid from UN agencies, the Arab world and the European Community (EC) countries equaled if not surpassed former Soviet contributions,[22] and this was before U.S. interventions. By fiscal year 1982, Somalia was the third-largest recipient of U.S. aid in Africa.[23] In late 1985, the World Bank reported that "the total of official development assistance for Somalia is one of the highest in Africa per head of population."[24]

For at least two reasons beyond sheer dollar value, these Western and Arab resources proved more lucrative than Soviet assistance ever had: They were more liquid and more intrinsically valuable. They were also far easier to siphon off and "misplace," which made them that much more valuable and more controllable by those in authority. In turn, not only did this make authority more coveted, but it also made those who held it more resented.

On the one hand, the assistance that flowed into Mogadishu did so through UN and other nonprofit coffers as Somalia suddenly found itself host to the world's largest number of refugees.[25] On the other hand, there were also unilateral strings attached to much of the aid, as Somalia remained geostrategically significant in Cold War calculations. However, there was a range of self-interested reasons to assist Somalia as well. For instance, the aid industry needed a new locale now that fighting in Cambodia was winding down.[26] In contrast, German government aid came largely as a result of a bargain it struck with the Somali government, which allowed German Special Forces soldiers to rescue a hijacked Lufthansa airliner at Mogadishu's airport. The sudden influx of aid overwhelmed the country's economic institutions, which had been geared to scientific socialism during the previous decade—not capitalism.

At the local level, it was not money and goods only that poured into Mogadishu from the West but also expatriate experts to administer the moneys and projects, and who had to be housed. Those who had access to the kinds of funds with which to build villas for these Westerners were Somali government officials with access to aid money. Thus not only did villas get built with misappropriated funds, they were rented out to foreign governments by these same Somali government officials. In fact, it was being said in Mogadishu in 1989 that because the U.S. government could not openly bribe Somali government ministers (as could other foreign governments), it had to curry favor more surreptitiously—by renting villas for its employees at extravagant rates, which clearly lined the pockets of these important government ministers.

The large amount of aid that poured into Mogadishu and stayed there, or was purposely kept there, was just one more injustice to rankle northern Somalis. Already there were regional and clan tensions as a result of scapegoating and fingerpointing after Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden War; as Siad Barre attempted to variously lay blame, liberalize, and stifle dissension, clannism was suddenly all too easy to read into his every action.[27] In part, it was easy to read because only individuals close to him had access to the aid flow. As criticism grew, Siad Barre tightened control, which fueled further resentment, which led him to rely more and more exclusively on relatives (who were already implicated through corruption), which only further fueled opposition, which eventually grew into war.

However, there is another way to interpret this spiral: As a good Somali, Siad Barre behaved correctly in taking care of kin first and redistributing what he had gained access to either along extended family lines or along other lines that could turn recipients into extended family. Unfortunately, by doing so—by being a good relative and a good Somali—he was bound to be a bad head of state, for two reasons: First, by controlling resources that others sought access to and not redistributing them nationally, Siad Barre not only made a mockery of the idea of "nation" but also ensured individuals' allegiance to family (and lineage and clan). Second, he set an example that made genealogy all too clear a determinant for group self-aggrandizement at the expense of nongroup members.

A full decade after the end of the Ogaden War, a number of militarily successful Somali opposition groups were being supported on Ethiopian soil;[28] indeed, occasionally both Libya and Ethiopia simultaneously supported the same groups. Yet none of these opposition movements ever successfully fused. Their failure is based not just on the fact that they were clan or clan family–based, as is often argued. Rather, regional players consciously kept the Somali opposition splintered enough to be nonthreatening as a supra-Somali force yet still capable of harrying Siad Barre. Indeed, the on-again, off-again relationship between Muammar Qaddafi and Siad Barre clearly matches the on-again, off-again relationship between

Qaddafi and the Somali rebels he was supporting. Nor was it only Qaddafi and Mengistu Haile Mariam who played a regional role in events in Somalia; it is likely that some members of the Saudi royal family also had a regional agenda, and one can only assume that a number of other local leaders were similarly engaged.[29]

Just as regional leaders played cat and mouse with Siad Barre, he busily did the same with them, successively wooing Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, even Israel and South Africa. In fact, shifts in regional politics played a large role in the country's dissolution, as hindsight clearly points a causal arrow from the agreement worked out between Mengistu and Siad Barre in the spring of 1988 to Siad Barre's downfall in 1991.

In particular, two momentous decisions made at this summit between the two Horn of Africa leaders split Somalia open: First, Mengistu agreed to no longer support any Somali opposition movements (in return for Siad Barre's promise not to meddle in Ethiopian affairs). Second, Siad Barre secretly agreed to give up Somalia's irredentist claims to the Ogaden.

What resulted from the first decision was a choice for Somali rebels. Essentially, they were faced with deciding how best to return to Somalia: peacefully or militarily. The Somali National Movement (SNM) the most prominent of the movements, chose the military option. Thus, in late spring of 1988, this predominantly Isaq force launched a stunningly successful offensive against the Somali army in the north; however, the SNM was unable to consolidate its victories before the government retaliated—with destructive force. Civil war, between north and south (the government vs. the Isaq), ensued.[30]

As for the secret agreement on the Ogaden, when this finally became public, it became the thin end of the wedge between Siad Barre and members of his mother's Ogaden clan—whose core territory was the Ogaden. This region had formerly offered Siad Barre considerable numerical strength, particularly since his own clan (the Marehan) was so small and a significant portion of the army was Ogadeni. There was also at least one broader regional implication in Ogadeni-Somali relations: In addition to the Ogaden clan's natural base of support among fellow clan members still in Ethiopia, there were also Ogadeni in Kenya. Indeed, Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi owed his longevity, if not his life, to the head of his Army, who is an Ogadeni.

Meanwhile, the more successes the SNM had—on behalf of northerners, who were predominantly Isaq—the more other clans were galvanized to establish or energize their own movements, and the longer the war in the north progressed, the more this encouraged these other groups (such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front and, eventually, the Somali Patriotic Movement) to take advantage of the government's preoccupation with the SNM to further their own interests and carve out their own areas of

influence. Much of what subsequently occurred in Somalia, in terms of peripheries swinging out of government control, was a matter of clans and/or clan families forming oppositions in order to project newly emergent corporate interests not only offensively but defensively against one another. It is not coincidental that the Hawiye, who were among the last clan families to organize, wound up being the most successful. Their success had as much to do with the position that many Hawiye happened to be in—surrounding Mogadishu—as with their aim to oust Siad Barre and keep everyone else away from the spoils of the capital, which lay in the heart of their territory.

However, while all of this was going on within Somalia, there was yet more going on outside the country. The World Bank, IMF, the EC, the Club of Paris, bilateral aid agencies (such as the U.S. Agency for International Development and the German Association for Technical Cooperation [GTZ]), and even the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (which was still supplying vast sums of money for hundreds of thousands of refugees in Somalia) variously threatened to withdraw support, did withdraw support, cajoled, relented, and returned support to the Somali government depending on how compliantly or defiantly the regime reacted to structural adjustment demands and other requirements for reform. All of these actions had repercussions in Somali markets and on Somalis' moods.

At the same time, on the diplomatic front, Somalia was subject to decisions that it could not always influence and that did not always pertain directly to it. Most significant of these was the new rapprochement between the superpowers, who had decided to cooperate rather than compete with one another. This had serious implications for the African clients of the superpowers. For example, one reason Mengistu and Siad Barre were so willing to negotiate with one another in the spring of 1988 was because each was being bled dry by rebels and ceaseless conflict; donors were not forthcoming with reinforcements, funds to pay for more troops, or arms to equip them. Both Horn of Africa countries had turned into currency black holes (and strategic redundancies) for their patrons. Thus, by the summer of 1989—when the United States could no longer ignore Siad Barre's prosecution of a war against his own civilians or atrocities committed in the capital—it was all too easy for George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev to agree that neither superpower would continue its support of conflict in the region.

While Siad Barre still had regional powers to draw on for support—and was fairly openly being armed by Libya as rebel movements broke out all through Somalia—the West proceeded to scale back, yet the opposition movements were still unable to unite. In fact, they kept proliferating, which proved doubly to Siad Barre's advantage—first, because they were so splintered and, second, because the situation was far too confusing to

outsiders who, while they may have wanted to see Siad Barre ousted, could not figure out who they would want in his stead.

Collapse of the Somali Nation-State

Why, then, did the oppositions suddenly succeed in 1991? On the one hand, it could be that too many pieces had finally spun out of control for Siad Barre and that the Hawiye finally had gained enough control around Mogadishu. On the other hand, such an answer may be too general and too gentle. And it does not consider timing in a broader context.

Essentially, Somalia was lost as soon as Kuwait was. This connection is both regional and international: The countries in the Gulf region have long played a far more important role in Somali affairs than has generally been recognized,[31] and certainly superpower relations have overshadowed and influenced regional relations. Yet no external actors stayed focused on Somalia once Operation Desert Shield began. And while at first glance this lapse in international interest in Somalia does seem to coincide with the end of the Cold War, in fact it was the inception of the Gulf War that created the real vacuum.

The Gulf War marked the first break in the internationalization of Somalia since well before 1960. Because the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf nations were directly embroiled in the war, Somalia was rendered insignificant. Or, to restate this with fuller meaning, Somalia (for the first time since its creation) was not the center of anyone's attention but its own.

The fact that Somalia went underrecognized and ceased to exist almost makes my point too easily: There never was a Somali nation or coherence within, just a Somali state (and faith in the coherence of borders) from without.

What, then, of the space that was Somalia in the immediate post–Gulf War era? The response to Somalia's dissolution and its cost in Somali lives eventually led to yet another international effort toward Somalia: Operation Restore Hope. Despite Operation Restore Hope (and in part because of the aid flow it reintroduced into Somalia), Somalis' future remains unclear. Historically, there has been no lasting union in Somalia beyond the level of clan family and that (as the Hawiye case proves—with component Abgal and Habr Gedir engaged in conflict shortly after the "Hawiye" takeover of Mogadishu in 1991) has not yet proved lasting enough. Rather, what peace there has been in Somalia since independence has been provided by outside pressures and wars extending beyond the state's borders.[32] Consequently, it would appear (as it clearly did to the UN in the launching of Operation Restore Hope) that outside mediation was the only

hope for Somalis making peace. Indeed, this is how peace is achieved at lower levels of Somali society; a neutral mediator tries to reconcile the two sides to a dispute. But who could possibly play this role for all Somalis? Who would Somalis regard as having unimpeachable credibility? No one.

In part, I write "no one" because the situation in Somalia has always been more complicated and structured than outsiders imagine anarchy to be. In part, though, "no one" also results from realpolitik. Mediation has always demanded two things: neutrality and an interested party. In terms of being committed, the interested party has to be disinterested enough to be able to think from a Somali point of view. But there are multiple Somali points of view. Who has the patience to absorb these countless views? More significantly, is there any party who has not already been too interested? We need only scroll back through the litany of interested parties who have tried to help so far and consider how they have demonstrated their understanding: with money, weapons, food, jobs, promises, threats. From this perspective, it should be small wonder that Somali trust remains so circumscribed and dissolution so obstinate. What hasn't there been to fight over? And who hasn't supplied it?

Notes

1. This is an argument set forth in Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995).

2. Richard Burton, *First Footsteps in East Africa* (New York: Dover Publications, 1894/1987), p. 103.

3. Burton, *First Footsteps*, p. 103.

4. See Ali Hersi, "The Arab Factor in Somali History: The Origins and Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural Influence in the Somali Peninsula" (Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1977).

5. See Mordechai Abir, *Ethiopia and the Red Sea: The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region* (London: Frank Cass, 1980); and Ahmed Yusuf Farah, "The Milk of the Boswellia Forests: Frankincense Production Among Pastoral Somali" (Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics, 1988).

6. There is an extensive literature on pastoral nomadism, both comparative and specific. For instance, see A. M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), and Andrew Smith, *Pastoralism in Africa: Origins and Development Ecology* (London: Hurst & Company, 1992), for general principles; and I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), for an examination of northern Somali pastoralism in particular.

7. For instances of Somali-Kenyan border problems dating back to the so-called *shifta* war, see I. M. Lewis, "The problem of the NFD of Kenya," *Race* 5 (1963); John Drysdale, *The Somali Dispute* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964); Earl of Lytton, *The Stolen Desert* (London: MacDonald, 1966). For examples of Somali-Ethiopian incursions, there are a number of bodies of literature cited in

notes 10 and 17. For relations between Somalia and Djibouti, see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Djibouti and the Horn of Africa* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968).

8. This has been described by Allan Hoben, *Somalia: A Social and Institutional Profile*, Working Paper SP-1 (African Studies Center, Boston University, 1983), and Vali Jamal, "Somalia: survival in a 'doomed' economy," *International Labor Review* 127,6 (1988).

9. The title of David Laitin and Said Samatar's 1987 book about Somalia is *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987).

10. The Sayyid's techniques and tactics are described in Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Ray Beachey, *The Warrior Mullah: The Horn Aflame 1892–1920* (London: Bellew Publishing, 1990); and Abdi Sheik-Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856–1920)* (London: Zed Books, 1993).

11. Ethnographic descriptions of interriverine peoples that explicitly point to differences between them and camel-herding pastoralist Somalis can be found in I. M. Lewis, "From Nomadism to Cultivation: The Expansion of Political Solidarity in Southern Somalia," in M. Douglas and P. M. Kaberry, eds., *Man in Africa* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969); Virginia Luling, "The Social Structure of Southern Somali Tribes" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1971); Lee Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600–1900* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982); and Bernhard Helander, "The Slaughtered Camel: Coping with Fictitious Descent Among the Hubeer of Southern Somalia" (Ph.D. dissertation, Uppsala University, 1988).

12. Although it seems increasingly clear in the anthropological literature that groups have merged, disappeared, been engulfed, and transformed, the connection between territoriality and genealogy has been ambiguously described (for perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed account of genealogical changes, see Gunther Schlee, *Identities on the Move: Clanship and Pastoralism in Northern Kenya* [Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1989]). From Evans-Pritchard's model ethnography on the Nuer (*The Nuer* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1940/1978]) on through more recent works, kinship appears to take precedence as an organizing principle over territory—which is possible principally because nomads are thought to have no lasting connection to any of the areas they occupy. However, ethnographies that overtly privilege kinship nonetheless imply the significance of "belonging" to an area, so that regardless of attempts to downplay territoriality, ethnographic descriptions of people's connections to wells and grazing areas belie anthropologists' own biases. Nomads' ability to possess (and be possessed by) land is perhaps best set forth by Joseph Hobbs, *Bedouin Life in the Egyptian Wilderness* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Hobbs (a geographer) unabashedly draws the connections between particular Bedouin kinship groups, identity, and territory.

13. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer*, is most often credited for initially modeling segmentary lineage opposition for anthropologists.

14. I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy*, and David Marlowe, "Commitment, Contract, Group Boundaries and Conflict," in J. H. Masserman, ed., *Violence and War with Clinical Studies* (New York: Grune & Stratton, 1963), describe the principles of segmentary lineage opposition for Somalis.

15. There is a long literature that addresses precisely this issue. See, for example, Holy Ladislav, *Segmentary Lineage Systems Reconsidered* (Belfast: The Queen's University of Belfast, 1979); and Lila Abu-Lughod, "Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World," *Annual Review of Anthropology* (1989).

16. Marlowe, "Commitment," emphasizes the paramount yet situational nature of conflict for Somalis. Whom conflict should embrace and how it should escalate is determined by the genealogical and contractual relationship of combatants. Between kin of a certain type, a homicide should not be avenged, whereas it must be avenged when the victim and perpetrator are not so related. Consequently, it is conflict that calls forth group responses, which are specific but never identical since (generally) disputants are rarely identically related. Thus disputes seldom call for the same configurations of kin. Consequently, levels of involvement vary such that groups are never permanently in place but are created by situations.

17. In addition to histories of Somalia that cover this period, such as I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longman, 1980), and A. I. Samatar, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Zed Books, 1988), there are a number of works that address the internationalization of the Ogaden War. These include: Tom Farer, *War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Detente* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1976); Robert Gorman, *Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1981); Robert Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Bereket Habte Selassie, *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980); Marina Ottaway, *Soviet and American Influence in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Praeger, 1982); and George Shepherd, Jr., "Dominance and Conflict on the Horn: Notes of United States–Soviet Rivalry," *Africa Today* 32,3 (1985). Expressly concerning the Ogaden War and its aftermath for Somalis, also see Colin Legum and Bill Lee, "Crisis in the Horn of Africa: International Dimensions of the Somali-Ethiopian Conflict," *Africa Contemporary Record* 10 (1977–1978); David Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden: Implications for Siyaad's Role in Somali History," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 17,1 (1979); "The Ogaadeen Question and Changes in Somali Identity," in D. Rothchild and V. A. Olorunsola (eds.), *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); and Harry Ododa, "Somalia's Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations Since the Ogaden War of 1977–78," *Middle-Eastern Studies* 21,3 (1985).

18. Simons, *Networks of Dissolution*.

19. *Africa Contemporary Record* 10 (1977–1978), p. B373.

20. Of course, there were all sorts of geostrategic and military considerations as well, with the Soviets attaining Kagnew Naval Air Station in Ethiopia (formerly occupied by the United States) and the Americans securing Soviet-built naval facilities at Berbera. In other words, it was not just the presence of the Soviets in Ethiopia that provoked U.S. interest in Somalia but also the location of both Ethiopia and Somalia along the Red Sea coast and their proximity to the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf.

21. *African Contemporary Record* 10 (1977–1978), p. B397. Interestingly, the role the Arab states (Saudi Arabia and Libya in particular) played during this period is glossed over in many of the more extensive works about international relations in the Horn, although it is clear from contemporaneous journal accounts (e.g., *African Contemporary Record* and *Indian Ocean Newsletter*) that Saudi Arabia was able to influence a number of Somali government policies, often in tandem with Western anti-Soviet aims but sometimes, too, through its control of purse strings for its own (or larger Arab/Islamic) purposes.

22. *African Contemporary Record* 11 (1978–1979), p. B289.

23. *African Contemporary Record* 14 (1981–1982), p. B265; *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, March 20, 1982.

24. *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, November 30, 1985. However, this issue of *ION* also notes that Somalia's "debt, which stood at $300 million in 1977, doubled in 1980 and more than quadrupled by the end of 1984, when it was estimated to have reached $1.4 billion; this is more than 12 times the total value of the country's exports in 1983, or the equivalent of 90 percent of the gross national product of that year."

25. *African Contemporary Record* 13 (1980–1981), p. B307.

26. Jonathan Tucker, "The Politics of Refugees in Somalia," *Horn of Africa* 5,3 (1982), p. 22.

27. See Laitin, "The War in the Ogaden"; "The Ogaadeen Question and Changes in Somali Identity"; and Abdi Sheik-Abdi, "Ideology and Leadership in Somalia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 19,1 (1981).

28. Namely, the SNM and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front.

29. A fuller treatment of this can be found in Simons, *Networks of Dissolution*. Sources for this period and the following summary of events leading up to Siad Barre's demise include *Africa Confidential* (1981–1990); *Africa Contemporary Record* (1968/1969–1986/1987); *Africa Diary* (1973–1984); *Africa Events* (1985–1990); *Africa Report* (1982–1989); *Africa Research Bulletin* (1977–1990); and *Indian Ocean Newsletter* (1981–1990). It should also be noted that there is a long history to the Egyptian-Somali relationship. Unraveling this history would help explain some of the animus many Somalis directed at Boutros Boutros-Ghali, whom they regarded not as the UN Secretary-General but first and foremost an Egyptian.

30. For a fuller treatment of SNM policies and practices, see I. M. Lewis's chapter (with G. P. Markis), "The Rise of the Somali National Movement: A Case History in the Politics of Kinship," in I. M. Lewis, *Blood and Bone* (London: Red Sea Press, 1994).

31. See note 21 and note 29 for sources that lead me to conclude this.

32. I refer to both the so-called shifta war with Kenya (1963–1967) and the Ogaden War with Ethiopia (1977–1978).

6

The International Context of Internal War: Ethiopia/Eritrea

TERRENCE LYONS

Armed conflicts in Ethiopia/Eritrea have had their roots in the contentious processes of state and nation building, the complex search for justice and equity, the difficult challenges of identity and governance, and the competition for scarce resources and sustainable development. The primary issues, actors, and dynamics have been internal. The conflicts, however, have also taken place in a regional and an international context that sometimes significantly shaped the dynamics of the struggles, the resources competing parties brought to bear in pursuit of their objectives, and therefore the prospects for managing, transforming, or resolving specific conflicts. As locally driven conflicts became internationalized and interlinked with both neighboring states and international actors, their nature was inevitably altered.

The Horn of Africa region, consisting of Ethiopia/Eritrea and its immediate neighbors—Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and Djibouti—has been the site of endemic inter- and intrastate conflict for decades.[1] The many conflicts are interlinked in a regional "security complex," a group of states whose "primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."[2] For example, Somali policies to create a "Greater Somalia" state that included ethnic Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti led to a series of conflicts from 1960 until the late 1980s. Ethiopia and Somalia fought a brief border skirmish in 1963–1964 and a major war in the Ogaden in 1977–1978 and supported insurgent groups and proxy forces throughout the period. Sudan provided critical refuge to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), which was seeking independence from Ethiopia in the 1970s and 1980s; Ethiopia, in turn, supported southern Sudanese rebel movements (first the Anya Nya until 1972, then the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and Army [SPLM/A] from 1983–1991)